Abstract. Electronic health records enable the global availability of medical data. This has numerous benefits for the quality of offered services. However, privacy concerns may arise as now both the patient's medical history as well as the doctor's activities can be tracked. In this paper, we propose an electronic health record system which allows the patient to control who has access to her health records. Furthermore, provided she does not misuse the system, a doctor will remain anonymous with respect to any central authority.
Introduction
In e-health, new information and communication technologies are used to improve the quality of healthcare services while at the same time reducing the corresponding costs. This is, for example, achieved by electronic health records (EHRs), which allow for global availability of medical information in a standardized format. EHRs enable efficient communication of medical information, and thus reduce costs and administrative overhead. Furthermore, medical errors can be reduced significantly. In current healthcare systems, medical data can be interpreted in ambiguous ways. Moreover, a patient's health records can be dispersed over multiple sites without the healthcare professional having access to (or even knowledge of) this data. EHRs provide a solution to these problems.
There are, however, serious privacy concerns associated with the move towards electronic health records. Medical data should not only be protected against outsiders, but also against insiders. Studies have shown that patients do not trust central authorities with their medical data. They want to decide themselves who is entrusted with this data and who is not. These concerns are justified, as unauthorized secondary use of medical information, for example by an employer or for advertising purposes, can easily be achieved.
Next to patients, healthcare providers want their privacy to be protected. A central repository of medical data controlled by strong access regulations allows for the monitoring of a doctor's actions. Central authorities can track down who is treated by which doctor, how, and for what reasons. Hence, patient-doctor autonomy is disrupted.
Unfortunately, current technologies abstract away from privacy concerns in order to obtain both secure and efficient health record systems. In this paper, we propose a system which is both secure and privacy-preserving. The system protects the patient's privacy by allowing her to control who has access to her medical information. However, no personal information can be hidden from the doctor entrusted with this access. Furthermore, a doctor's privacy is conditionally preserved: unless abuse is detected, no central authority knows which patient is treated by which doctor and for what purposes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the building blocks used in the system are introduced. Afterwards, we describe the system itself and evaluate its properties. Finally, we conclude the paper with a brief discussion of related work and a summary containing the major conclusions and future work.
Basic Building Blocks

Cryptographic Hash Functions
A good hash function H resembles a random function as much as possible. It takes an input of arbitrary length and maps it to an output of fixed length. Hash functions are efficiently computable but hard to invert. Also, it is difficult to find two inputs mapping onto the same output.
The RSA Function
The RSA function [11] for an instance (n, v) is a trapdoor one-way permutation in Z * n defined as RSA (n,v) : w → w v mod n. Here, value n is constructed as the product of two random primes p and q with binary length |p| = |q| = |n|/2. Value v is randomly chosen and relative prime to φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1).
The function is efficiently computable and easy to invert if v −1 mod φ(n) is known. It is assumed that in all other cases, the RSA function is hard to invert.
In the remainder of this paper, we will denote the execution of i subsequent applications of RSA (n,v) to an initial value w as RSA
The Guillou-Quisquater Proof of Knowledge
A Guillou-Quisquater proof of knowledge [7] is an interactive protocol between a prover P and a verifier V. The inputs to the protocol are public values x and (n, v). After successful execution, V is convinced that P knows a value w such that w = RSA −1 (n,v) (x). In addition, the only thing V can learn from this protocol execution is whether or not P knows such a w.
In the remainder of this paper, we will denote the Guillou-Quisquater proof for an instance (n, v i ) with i ∈ N \ {0} as GQProof{RSA
Verifiable Encryption
A verifiable encryption scheme [13, 1, 3] is an interactive two-party protocol between a prover P and a verifier V . The public input of the protocol is a public encryption key pk and a value x with (w, x) ∈ R for a one-way relation R and a secret value w only known to P. After successful execution, V obtains an encryption of w under public key pk. A verifiable encryption ensures the verifier that the encrypted value w is as such that (w, x) ∈ R for the specified relation R and public value x. As a consequence, it also convinces V that the prover knows a secret value w corresponding to x. Moreover, the protocol does not reveal any additional information about w to V than what she already knew beforehand. In particular, if V does not know the private key sk corresponding to pk, then she cannot find out w.
A verifiable encryption protocol can be created for the RSA relation (w, x = RSA i (n,v) (w)). In the remainder of the paper, this encryption will be denoted as VEncrypt pk {w, w = RSA
Anonymous Credential Systems
Anonymous credentials [4, 2] allow for anonymous yet accountable transactions between users and organizations. Here, a simplified version of the system is presented. In particular, not all functionality is described and abstraction is made of the use of pseudonyms. Also, note that anonymous credential systems should be built on top of anonymous communication channels [5, 10] .
Credential Issuing. An organization can issue a credential to a user. This credential may contain attributes such as a name, address or expiration date. After successful execution of the issue protocol, the user receives a non-transferable credential Cred and the organization receives an issue transcript. The issue protocol will be denoted as getCred(attrlist) → Cred; GetT rans.
Credential Showing. The user proves to an organization that she is in possession of a credential Cred. In addition, she selectively discloses some attributes to the verifier. The result of the protocol is a transcript ShowTrans for the verifier. Different transcripts (and thus different shows) of the same credential cannot be linked to each other or to their corresponding GetTrans. During a show protocol, the user may decide to enable some additional options; she may sign a message Msg with her credential, which provides a provable link between ShowTrans and this message. In addition, she might enable ShowTrans to be deanonymizable. Upon fulfillment of the condition DeanCond, this allows for a trusted deanonymizer to recover the corresponding transcript GetTrans, which might then be used to identify the user. In the sequel, the show protocol will be denoted as showCred(Cred, [attrs] 
Credential Revocation. A credential can be revoked by its issuer. This is denoted as revokeCred(GetT rans).
Description of the System
We first give an overview of the system's requirements, roles and protocols. Afterwards, the construction of these protocols is described in detail.
Requirements, Roles and Protocols
Requirements. The system consists of anonymized electronic health records, which are stored in a central database. Each record contains medical information about a patient, signed by an approved but unknown healthcare professional.
To protect the patient's privacy, only authorized doctors may access the database. These doctors can read and inspect all the health records. However, unless they have gained the patient's trust, doctors should not be able to link different records of a patient to each other or to the patient. This trust must be complete, i.e. the patient must not be able to hide partial medical information towards a trusted doctor.
Doctors must enjoy full anonymity with respect to the system. It must not be possible for any central authority to track down which patient is treated by which doctor and for what purposes. However, when abuse of anonymity is detected, this anonymity should be revoked and appropriate actions should be taken. Types of abuse are, for example, illegal requests for a patient's health records or the submitting of incorrect health records.
Roles. An individual using the system is either a doctor D or a patient P. A doctor is assumed to live up to a deontological code and does not share any medical information about a patient with another doctor, unless both are entrusted with the care of this person. A special type of doctor is an emergency doctor ED. An emergency doctor works at an emergency room (ER) and hence needs special privileges.
The system itself consists of a registrar R, a database manager DBMan, and an emergency service ES. Next to this, a number of deanonymizers may be present. Deanonymizers judge and perform deanonymizations when abuse is detected. The registrar stores bookkeeping information and registers both patients and doctors. The database manager guides the retrieval and addition of health records from and to the database by performing the necessary access controls. Finally, the emergency service performs emergency retrieval of health records when the patient is unconscious and her doctor is unreachable.
Protocols.
A patient entering the system first performs a patientRegistration with R. As a result, she obtains a list of private keys sk p (i) (i ∈ {1, . . . , t}), which will be used at successive moments in time. P can now entrust a doctor D with her medical information by executing a visitDoctor protocol with D. From then on this doctor will be able to manage all of her health records. If P wants to end this trust relation, she enables a new private key sk p (i + 1) by performing the changePrivateKey protocol with R. As a consequence, D will no longer be able to add or retrieve any new health records concerning P .
A doctor registers with the system by executing the doctorRegistration protocol with R. This provides her with an access credential to the record database. Once entrusted by a patient, D can manage her health records by means of the addHealthRecord and retrieveHealthRecords protocols. Finally, a doctor working at ER may perform an emergency retrieval of a patient's medical data by using the emergencyRetrieval protocol.
Practical Construction
System Setup. A trusted third party TTP generates a strong hash function H and system parameters (n, v) for the RSA-function. Furthermore, the emergency service ES generates an encryption keypair (pk es , sk es ). Private key sk es is kept secret by ES, while values (n, v), H and pk es are made public to all participants. As no participant may invert the RSA-function, TTP must make sure the factors p and q of n = pq are discarded immediately after parameter generation.
Health Records. A health record is a show transcript ShowTrans generated as a result of a deanonymizable credential show by a doctor. The content of the record is a message of the form (ID,medical data), signed during the show protocol. Medical data is a text string representing the health information and ID is a unique identification tag created as ID = H(sk p (i) j) for a counter value j and a patient's temporal private key sk p (i). To ensure the uniqueness of ID, each counter value is used only once for a temporal private key.
PatientRegistration. A patient entering the system first generates her (private keys, public key) pair ((sk p (1), . . . , sk p (t)), pk p ). This is done in a preprocessing stage. Patient P chooses a suitable t and random value x ∈ R Z * n . She then sets sk p (i) = RSA t−i (n,v) (x) for i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and pk p = RSA t (n,v) (x). Each of the private keys will be used at successive moments in time. Note that, given private key sk p (i), all previous keys sk p (j) with j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} can be computed, but none of the future keys sk p (k) with k ∈ {i + 1, . . . , t}.
P then starts the registration procedure with R. In a first step, she identifies herself to R and provides her with a verifiable encryption ω skp(1) of sk p (1), encrypted under the emergency service's public key. Note that ω skp(1) implicitly proves her knowledge of sk p (1). Afterwards, P retrieves a credential binding her identity with her current private key sk p (1).
The registrar additionally stores some bookkeeping information for later use. In particular, she stores a specification i = 1 of the current private key sk p (i), a verifiable encryption of sk p (1) and the current value n 1 for the counter used when creating a new record ID. She also stores the credential's issue transcript.
P
: ((sk p (1) , . . . , sk p (t)), pk p ) = generatekeys(t) 2. P ↔ R : verification of P 's identity 3. P → R : send(pk p ) 4. P ↔ R : ω skp(1) = VEncrypt pkes {sk p (1), sk p (1) = RSA −1 (n,v) (pk p )} 5. P ↔ R : getCred({'patient', P, pk p , 1}) → Cred skp(1) ; GetTrans skp(1) 6. R : store(P, pk p , {1, ω skp(1) , GetTrans skp(1) }, {1, n 1 = 0}) DoctorRegistration. A doctor registering with the system provides her identity and relevant university diplomas to R. The registrar checks this information, and, if approved, issues a doctor credential. This credential contains the doctor's specialties, such as, for example, the fact that she is an emergency physician. VisitDoctor. Although a patient can visit her doctor anonymously, she must allow D to access her complete list of health records. Therefore, she gives D her private key sk p (i) and additionally proves that this is her current private key by showing both her credential and her public key pk p . The resulting show transcript is then stored by D as a proof of the patient's trust. The private key sk p (i) can now be used by D to access the patient's health records.
AddHealthRecord(P ). In order to add a patient's health record to the system, a new counter value must be obtained from R. Using this value, a doctor can create an identifier ID for the record. The record itself is then signed by a deanonymizable credential show and stored by DBMan in the database.
The communication between D and both central authorities should be anonymous. Furthermore, for accountability reasons, D must prove to the registrar that she is a valid doctor knowing the private key sk p (i). This is done by a deanonymizable credential show combined with a GQ proof of knowledge. 
